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Article
Arizona v. Gant: The Good, the Bad, and the Meaning
of “Reasonable Belief”
GEOFFREY S. CORN
Reasonable belief. The Supreme Court’s ambiguous use of this term in
Arizona v. Gant transformed what could have been a clear logical holding
into a source of potential uncertainty. Consequently, lower courts have
struggled to interpret the reasonableness of police automobile searches
subsequent to the arrest of a vehicle occupant. By endorsing an entirely
new automobile search authority—one that is triggered by reasonable
belief that evidence related to the offense of arrest may be found in the
automobile—police search authority will in many cases be expanded.
Reasonable belief that evidence related to the arrest may be in the
automobile operates as a procedural tether, linking the probable cause of
the arrest to the search for that specific evidence. Interpreting reasonable
belief as a synonym for reasonable suspicion is inconsistent with the most
fundamental principle in search law: pure evidentiary searches may only
be reasonable when based on probable cause. Gant’s articulation of
reasonable belief presents a new source of search authority, distinct from
both the traditional authority granted by a search incident to a lawful
arrest and the authority granted by probable cause. Viewing the Court’s
decision in Gant as a procedural tether—albeit one with necessary
substantive overtones—is, despite first impression, neither a hindrance to
police procedure nor a detriment to the public good.

177

ARTICLE CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 179
II. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................... 180
III. FROM BELTON TO GANT................................................................... 183
A. SETTING THE CONDITIONS: BELTON, SITLA,
AND THE GANT BACKLASH .............................................................. 184
B. ARIZONA V. GANT AND THE END OF THE BLANK CHECK ....................... 187
IV. LOWER COURT UNCERTAINTY: REASONABLE SUSPICION,
PROBABLE CAUSE, OR SOMETHING NEW? ................................ 194
V. THORNTON AND THE BIRTH OF ”REASONABLE BELIEF” ......... 197
VI. THE GANT BALANCE SHEET ........................................................... 205
A. THE GOOD (FOR POLICE) ..................................................................... 209
B. THE GOOD (FOR THE PUBLIC) .............................................................. 210
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 212

Arizona v. Gant: The Good, the Bad, and the Meaning
of “Reasonable Belief”
GEOFFREY S. CORN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Reasonable belief. Use of this phrase by the Supreme Court in Arizona
v. Gant1 transformed what could have been a clear and logical holding into
a source of potential uncertainty. This uncertainty has forced lower courts
to struggle when determining the reasonableness of police automobile
searches subsequent to the arrest of a vehicle occupant—a manifestation of
how Gant blurred what was among the brightest lines in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
Furthermore, on the surface Gant’s
constriction of authority to search an automobile incident to lawful arrest
may seem to enhance the protection of privacy, but this is a tenuous
conclusion. Instead, police search authority will in many cases actually be
expanded by endorsing a wholly new automobile search authority that is
triggered by reasonable belief that evidence related to the offense of arrest
may be found in the car.
This Article highlights why “reasonable belief” that evidence related to
the arrest may be in the automobile operates as a procedural tether linking
the probable cause for the arrest to the search for that evidence. In support
of this interpretation, the Article explains why treating reasonable belief as
a synonym for reasonable suspicion is palpably hostile to the most
fundamental principle of search law: pure evidentiary searches may only
be reasonable when based on probable cause. Accordingly, reasonable
belief within the meaning of Gant is a wholly new source of search
authority, distinct both from the traditional authority granted by a search
incident to a lawful arrest (“SITLA”) and the authority granted by probable
cause. Finally, the Article explains why viewing the Court’s decision in
Gant as a procedural tether—albeit one with necessary substantive
overtones—is, despite first impression, neither a hindrance to police
procedure nor a detriment to the public good.
*

Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law in Houston, Texas. Previously Lieutenant
Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. I would like to thank Lorne Book, Rachel
Smith, and Amanda Williams for their excellent contributions in support of completing this Article.
1
556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (“[C]ircumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search
incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest
might be found in the vehicle.’” (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia,
J., concurring))).

180

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:177

II. BACKGROUND
Gant’s core holding constricts the authority to search an automobile
incident to lawful arrest, an authority established by the Court almost thirty
years earlier in New York v. Belton.2 In so holding, the Court reasoned that
once the arrestee is secure, a subsequent search of the vehicle is only
justified if there is “reasonable belief” that evidence of the offense of arrest
might be found in the vehicle.3 The Court concluded that Belton had
evolved to a point that could no longer be justified by the underlying
exigency rationale for SITLA,4 creating an automatic and unrestricted
search authority whenever the police arrested an occupant or recent
occupant of an automobile.5 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
Belton’s SITLA authority must be restricted to only those situations
involving a genuine risk that the arrestee could gain access to the passenger
compartment of the automobile immediately after arrest,6 with that
authority expiring once the arrestee is secured in a manner that deprives
her of any meaningful access to the automobile.7
Had the Court’s analysis been limited to defining the constriction of
Belton’s SITLA authority, little uncertainty would have resulted: once an
arrestee was effectively secured, an alternative exception to the warrant
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment would then
govern the reasonableness of all other intrusions into the arrestee’s
automobile.8 The Court, however, did not limit its analysis to this
continuum. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens introduced an
apparently new standard—inspired by Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
2

453 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1981).
Gant, 556 U.S at 335.
4
See id. at 343 (“To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent
occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel
exception . . . .”).
5
See, e.g., id. at 345–46 (2009) (“Courts that have read Belton expansively are at odds regarding
how close in time to the arrest and how proximate to the arrestee’s vehicle an officer’s first contact
with the arrestee must be to bring the encounter within Belton’s purview and whether a search is
reasonable when it commences or continues after the arrestee has been removed from the scene. The
rule has thus generated a great deal of uncertainty, particularly for a rule touted as providing a ‘bright
line.’” (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 7.1(c), 514–18 (4th ed. 2004) (“Thus, under Belton a search of the vehicle is allowed even after the
defendant was removed from it . . . . But because Belton abandoned the presumably difficult-to-apply
‘immediate control’ test of Chimel in favor of a ‘bright line,’ it is most certainly arguable that an onthe-scene requirement is appropriate as the nearest available ‘bright line.’”))).
6
Id. at 343.
7
See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search.” (emphasis added)).
8
See id. at 335 (concluding, in addition to clarifying Belton, that “circumstances unique to the
automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of
the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle”).
3
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Thornton v. United States —to justify a search of an automobile: “We also
conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a
search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of
the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”10 Until Gant, no such
reasonable belief test for assessing a reasonable search existed in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.11 Instead, a two-prong equation had become
settled law: (1) a full evidentiary search is reasonable only when supported
by probable cause; and (2) a cursory protective inspection is reasonable
based on a lower quantum of reasonable suspicion.12
This reasonable belief justification must be distinct from the authority
to conduct a SITLA. This is because the reasonableness of a SITLA has
never depended on the presence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion
of discovering evidence. Instead, SITLA is justified by the exigency
created by the lawful predicate arrest.13 Indeed, the core holding of Gant
reflected this by excluding the search for evidence in Gant’s car from the
reasonable scope of a SITLA.14 Accordingly, Gant introduced an
apparently new test into the existing continuum of reasonableness analysis,
a test that has and will continue to produce uncertainty. This uncertainty
has forced lower courts to struggle to identify the meaning and scope of
9

9
541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would therefore limit Belton searches to
cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.”). But see id. at 623–24 (majority opinion) (holding that a warrantless search conducted under
the SITLA exception did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the suspect had exited the
vehicle prior to being stopped by police, because the suspect was still found to have been a “recent
occupant” of the vehicle, such that the SITLA fell within the Belton exception).
10
Gant, 556 U.S. at 335. But see Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 n.4 (“Whatever the merits of Justice
Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment, this is the wrong case in which to address them.
Petitioner has never argued that Belton should be limited ‘to cases where it is reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle,’ nor did any court below
consider Justice Scalia’s reasoning.” (citation omitted)).
11
See Gant, 556 U.S. at 363–64 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the second part of the Court’s
two-part test, which the Court borrowed from Justice Scalia’s opinion in Thornton).
12
See Memorandum from Charles Doyle, Senior Specialist, Am. L. Div., Cong. Res. Serv. to
Mike Davidson, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, and
Reasonableness Standards in the Context of the Fourth Amendment and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act 3 (Jan. 30, 2006) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is of relatively recent
origins. . . . [U]nder certain exigencies of time and place police officers may conduct a limited seizure
and search with less than probable cause . . . .” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968))),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m013006.pdf) (last visited June 19, 2012).
13
See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at 337–38 (reasoning that, based on Chimel, the SITLA exception to
the warrant requirement is justified by interests in officer safety and evidence preservation).
14
See id. at 335 (“Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed and
locked in the back of a patrol car . . . . Accordingly, we hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle
search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the
interior of the vehicle.”).
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15

reasonable belief. Indeed, lower court decisions have begun to evince
several possible interpretations.
First, “reasonable belief” may be interpreted as a synonym for
reasonable suspicion16—a rational interpretation based on the similarity of
the two terms. However, this interpretation renders a full search of an
automobile reasonable based on a quantum of proof lower than probable
cause, a result clearly in conflict with longstanding Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.17 Second, “reasonable belief” could be interpreted as a
synonym for probable cause.18 This interpretation would certainly
reconcile the decision with prior Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
However, such a reading ignores the Court’s use of a term distinct from
traditional probable cause terminology, as well as the Court’s recitation of
pre-existing search authority (including probable cause search authority).
Thus, it is simply impossible to reconcile Gant with the pre-existing
probable cause–reasonable suspicion continuum. Accordingly, there is a
compelling argument in support of recognition of a new test for a limited
category of reasonable automobile searches.
The Gant Court’s reliance on Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Thornton19 is critical to properly understand the meaning of this new test.
In Thornton, Justice Scalia asserted that the search of a recently arrested
defendant’s vehicle was not based on a necessity to protect evidence from
destruction.20 Instead, the search was justified based on the relationship
between the evidence and the nature of the offense for which the defendant
was arrested.21 If this justification holds, “reasonable belief” could in fact
mean probable cause. This, however, is a dubious interpretation. There is

15
See, e.g., People v. Coates, 266 P.3d 397, 399 (Colo. 2011) (creating and using the term
“reasonable articulable suspicion” in the wake of Gant to describe the necessary quantum of proof
needed by police to conduct a SITLA for evidence related to the crime of arrest).
16
See Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and Three-Dollar Steaks: The Subjective/Objective
Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 772 (2010)
(“[R]easonable suspicion . . . [requires] that ‘the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based
on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger.’”
(second emphasis added) (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990))).
17
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures “wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable
‘expectation of privacy’”).
18
See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“[T]he substance of all the
definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and that the belief of guilt must
be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.” (emphasis added)).
19
541 U.S. 615, 625–32 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
20
Id. at 625.
21
See id. at 629–30 (arguing that “it is not illogical to assume that evidence of a crime is most
likely to be found where the suspect was apprehended,” thus “[t]he fact of prior lawful arrest
distinguishes . . . a search for evidence of his crime from general rummaging”).
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no question that probable cause must exist to justify the arrest.22
According to Justice Scalia, when that probable cause relates to an offense
for which related evidence may be found at the scene of the arrest, it is the
arrest itself that justifies the subsequent search of that scene; the probable
cause for the arrest effectively provides concurrent justification for the
search.23 Based on this reasoning, this Article asserts that “reasonable
belief” does not indicate a new substantive causal standard justifying a
search of an automobile, but instead introduces a link—or procedural
tether—connecting probable cause for an arrest with a subsequent search
of a recently occupied automobile for offense-related evidence.
Part III of this Article will trace the evolution of the Belton SITLA
authority from its origin in Belton to the Gant backlash. Part IV will
address the uncertainty triggered by Gant’s “reasonable belief” language
through analysis of several illustrative post-Gant decisions. Part V will
analyze the lineage of the “reasonable belief” concept adopted by the Gant
Court, and how that lineage supports the conclusion that “reasonable
belief” creates a procedural tether to the probable cause for arrest. Part VI
then assesses Gant’s impact on the interests of law enforcement and the
individual citizen. Part VII concludes that interpreting “reasonable belief”
within the meaning of Gant as a distinct concept from both traditional
SITLA authority and the authority granted by probable cause is the only
interpretation consistent with existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
and that interpreting “reasonable belief” as a procedural tether—albeit one
with necessary substantive overtones—is neither a hindrance to police
procedure nor a detriment to the public good despite first appearances.
III. FROM BELTON TO GANT
The uncertainty created by the Court’s use of “reasonable belief” in
Gant was a reaction, in part, to the legal fiction in Belton that had
expanded what constitutes “an area within a suspect’s immediate
control.”24 Based on this legal fiction, in 1981, the Supreme Court
extended the longstanding authority for police to conduct a full search
incident to lawful arrest to the interior compartment of an automobile
following the arrest of its occupants.25

22
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (equating lawful
arrest with probable cause); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981) (“[E]very
arrest . . . is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause.”); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (explaining that a custodial arrest based on probable cause is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment).
23
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
24
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
25
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
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A. Setting the Conditions: Belton, SITLA, and the Gant Backlash
In New York v. Belton,26 a New York State Police Officer stopped a car
traveling on the New York State Thruway for erratic driving.27 When the
officer approached the vehicle, he detected an odor of marijuana coming
from the passenger compartment.28 He also observed a brown paper bag
on the floor in front of the passenger seat with “Supergold” written on it.29
Based on this information, the officer ordered the four vehicle passengers
to exit, placed them under arrest, and had them sit on the side of the road.30
No other officers were present at the scene.31 Without seeking consent, the
officer proceeded to search the interior of the automobile, where he found
a jacket belonging to the passenger Belton.32 He then searched the pockets
of the jacket, in which he found cocaine.33 Belton was subsequently
prosecuted for possession of cocaine.34
Belton sought to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of an unreasonable
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment (as applied to the state via the
Fourteenth Amendment).35 Belton argued, and the New York Court of
Appeals agreed, that the officer exceeded the scope of the SITLA authority
triggered by the arrest of the vehicle occupants because the interior of the
vehicle and the jacket were beyond the wingspan of the arrestees at the
time of the search.36 This argument relied on Chimel v. California,37 in
which the Court held that it was reasonable to search within an arrestee’s
“immediate control” in order both to preserve evidence by protecting it
from possible destruction by the arrestee and to discover weapons that
might be used to harm the police and/or facilitate the arrestee’s escape.38
In Chimel, the Court held that extending the SITLA beyond the arrestee’s
26

453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 455.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 455–56.
30
Id. at 456.
31
Id. at 457.
32
Id. at 456.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
38
Id. at 762–63 (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest
or effect his escape. . . . And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front
of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of
the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the
area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”). As noted throughout this Article, this
has become known as the “wingspan” rule.
27
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wingspan exceeded the scope justified by the recent arrest and was
therefore unreasonable absent an alternative justification.39
In Belton, the Court rejected the Chimel argument that the search of the
automobile interior, and containers therein, was unreasonable because it
exceeded the wingspan of the arrestees.40 In an effort to establish a
universally applicable reasonableness standard in the automobile context,
the Court created what was really a fiction: that the interior of the
automobile remained within the “lunging distance” of the arrestees.41 Of
course, Belton was the ideal case for extending the wingspan rule:
outnumbered four to one, with the suspects seated near the vehicle, the
arresting officer was at a distinct disadvantage.42 Nonetheless, there was
no indication that a sense of exigency motivated his search, nor did the
Court qualify the extension of the SITLA authority in any way that
required proof of such a tactical disadvantage for the arresting officer.
Instead, the decision seemed to grant police the automatic authority to
conduct a general search of the interior of an automobile, and any
containers found therein, following the arrest of its occupants.43
In Belton, the officer was arguably searching for narcotics—evidence
related to the offense for which he had just arrested the suspects.44
However, SITLA has never been limited in scope to fruits related to the
offense that triggers the search. From the inception of SITLA as a basis to
establish the reasonableness of a police search, the immediate search of the
area within the arrestee’s wingspan was deemed reasonable by the
exigency of the arrestee’s ability to access evidence or weapons.45
Accordingly, SITLA has always stood as an exception not only to the
39
See id. at 768 (“The search here went far beyond the petitioner’s person and the area from
within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as
evidence against him. There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for
extending the search beyond that area. The scope of the search was, therefore, ‘unreasonable’ . . . .”).
40
See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 (“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification.”).
41
See id. at 460 (suggesting that “articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger
compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which
an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]’” (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at
763)); infra notes 137 and 138 and accompanying text.
42
See Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56 (describing the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the four
car occupants by a single policeman).
43
See id. at 460 (“[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of
that automobile.”).
44
Id. at 456.
45
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (asserting that it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the arrestee in order to remove concealed weapons and prevent the
destruction or concealment of evidence, and that “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule”).
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warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but also to the probable
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.46 Because police are
authorized to search for any evidence or contraband, there has never been a
link between the scope of the SITLA and evidence related to the arrested
offense.47 Indeed, any requirement to establish such a link was
categorically rejected by the Court in United States v. Robinson,48 where
the Court held that “[t]he standards traditionally governing a search
incident to lawful arrest are not, therefore, commuted to the stricter Terry
standards by the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the
particular crime for which the arrest is made.”49 The Court further noted
that:
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that
intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires
no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest
which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in
the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person
is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, but is also a “reasonable” search under
that Amendment.50
So much has been apparent in the Court’s pre-Gant SITLA
jurisprudence. Exigency, and not the discovery of evidence, became the
predominant interest that the exception advanced. Accordingly, the Court
extended the SITLA exception to cover not only the arrested automobile
occupant but also the recent occupant of an automobile arrested shortly
after exiting the vehicle.51 In Thornton v. United States,52 the Court held
reasonable the search of the suspect’s automobile following his arrest after
he exited the vehicle.53 According to the Court, extending SITLA to such
46
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (arguing that seizure of private
documents from the accused’s home, in his absence and without a warrant, runs afoul of the protections
afforded by the Fourth Amendment), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
47
See id. at 392 (explaining that the Government’s right “to search the person of the accused
when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime . . . has been uniformly
maintained in many cases”).
48
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
49
Id. at 234.
50
Id. at 235.
51
See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622 (2004) (“Belton allows police to search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial arrest of both ‘occupant[s]’ and
‘recent occupant[s].’”).
52
541 U.S. 615 (2004).
53
See id. at 620 (“[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of
that automobile.” (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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situations was consistent with its underlying exigency and police safety
justifications: it was simply untenable to force an officer into the
“Hobson’s choice”54 of either approaching a vehicle in which the suspect
might be armed in order to preserve the authority to search the vehicle
upon arrest, or sacrificing that search authority by allowing the suspect to
exit the vehicle into full view before initiating the arrest.55
Following Thornton, the only lingering uncertainty surrounding
automobile SITLA authority was how proximate the exiting driver must be
to the vehicle before the authority dissipated.56 Accordingly, the
admissibility of evidence seized from the interior compartment of an
automobile, or a container therein, following the lawful arrest of a driver or
occupant became a genuine article of faith. Lawful arrest was the sine qua
non for admissibility. Other factors relating to the arrest were simply
irrelevant, including: the nature of the offense; whether the offense was
one traditionally associated with violence; the relative probability or
improbability that evidence related to the offense might be in the vehicle;
the ability of the suspect to gain access to the vehicle at the time of the
search; the number of officers at the scene; the number of suspects; or the
location of the vehicle. In short, an arrest for a minor traffic infraction of
the proverbial eighty-year-old grandmother triggered the authority to
search the entire interior compartment of her automobile, even if she was
secured in the back of the arresting officer’s police cruiser with numerous
other officers on the scene.
B. Arizona v. Gant and the End of the Blank Check
The Court’s Gant decision thus rested on the background of the
apparently unlimited search authority triggered by the arrest of an
automobile occupant or recent occupant.57 In many ways, Gant provided
as compelling a set of facts as Belton to revisit the automobile exception
that Belton established in the first instance. Unlike the Belton situation of
an outnumbered officer who discovered evidence somewhat related to the
arresting offense, Gant involved a situation where neither the search for
evidence nor officer safety seemed to justify the subsequent automobile
search.58
54
A “Hobson’s choice” is a “take it or leave it” option in which a party is offered the free choice
of only one option. According to the Court, “a Hobson’s choice is not a choice, whatever the reason
for being Hobsonian.” Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 707 (2002).
55
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622.
56
See United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1038–41 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding automobile
search conducted after the arrestee had been handcuffed and placed in a patrol car); United States v.
Barnes, 374 F.3d 601, 602–03 (8th Cir. 2004) (same).
57
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 340–41 (2009).
58
See id. at 344 (“Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offenserelated evidence authorized the search in this case.”).
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In Gant, police arrested the suspect for driving with a suspended
license.59 Following his arrest, Gant was secured in the back seat of a
locked police cruiser.60 Several other police cruisers and officers were
present at the scene.61 Nonetheless, the police proceeded to search the
interior of Gant’s automobile. In Gant’s automobile, police discovered and
seized evidence unrelated to the offense of driving with a suspended
license.62 Prior to his trial on charges of possession of a weapon and
possession of drug paraphernalia, Gant moved to suppress the evidence
discovered in his car.63 At the outset, the trial court rejected the state’s
assertion that the police acted upon probable cause that evidence related to
the arresting offense would be found in the car so as to trigger the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.64 This was a critical
conclusion, for it eliminated the only plausible alternative justification for
a warrantless search of the car. However, the trial court then applied the
Belton/Thornton rule and concluded that the search was reasonable
because Gant had been lawfully arrested immediately after exiting his
vehicle.65
Gant appealed the issue to the Arizona Supreme Court, which
ultimately rejected the trial court’s application of the SITLA exception and
reversed Gant’s conviction.66 The U.S. Supreme Court summarized the
Arizona Supreme Court’s rationale as follows:
[T]he Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the search of
Gant’s car was unreasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The court’s opinion discussed at length
our decision in Belton, which held that police may search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers
therein as a contemporaneous incident of an arrest of the
vehicle’s recent occupant. The court distinguished Belton as
a case concerning the permissible scope of a vehicle search
incident to arrest and concluded that it did not answer “the
threshold question whether the police may conduct a search
incident to arrest at all once the scene is secure.” Relying on
our earlier decision in Chimel, the court observed that the
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant
requirement is justified by interests in officer safety and
59

Id. at 332.
Id.
61
Id. at 344.
62
Id. at 336.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 337.
66
Id.
60

2012]

ARIZONA V. GANT

189

evidence preservation. When “the justifications underlying
Chimel no longer exist because the scene is secure and the
arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol car,
and under the supervision of an officer,” the court concluded,
a “warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be justified
as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the
destruction of evidence.” Accordingly, the court held that the
search of Gant’s car was unreasonable.67
The Supreme Court then noted that the Arizona Supreme Court’s
dissenting justices rejected the majority’s consideration of any actual
Chimel justification as the basis for the reversal.68 For the dissent, such
consideration of actual exigency was inconsistent with the Belton/Thornton
SITLA rule.69 In essence, the dissent understood SITLA as an automatic
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements, regardless of
how attenuated from the original Chimel SITLA rationale a particular
application might be.70 However, the dissent also acknowledged that the
bright line Belton rule had become difficult to justify in cases like Gant’s,
and therefore joined in the call for reconsideration by the U.S. Supreme
Court.71 That request landed on a receptive Court, which noted in its
opinion: “The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton includes courts,
scholars, and Members of this Court who have questioned that decision’s
clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles. We therefore
granted the State’s petition for certiorari.”72
In a 5–4 majority opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of its Arizona counterpart, in large
measure adopting the rationale of the state supreme court.73 Focusing on
the original exigency justification upon which Belton was built, the Court
rejected a broad reading of Belton.74 Instead, it limited the application of
Belton’s SITLA authority to those situations in which a recent arrestee
could legitimately gain access to the interior of the automobile:
“Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel
rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”75
67

Id. at 337–38 (citations omitted).
Id. at 338 (quoting State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 647 (Ariz. 2007) (Bales, J., dissenting), aff’d,
556 U.S. 332 (2009)).
69
Id.
70
See id.
71
Id. at 338.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 351.
74
Id. at 343.
75
Id.
68
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Had the Court stopped there, Gant would have been nothing more than
a clarification on the applicability of the Belton rule. However, in a
separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia interjected a somewhat
perplexing new element into the meaning of the decision. Drawing on his
concurring opinion in Thornton, Justice Scalia added a new dimension to
the trigger for a Belton SITLA, a dimension that migrated to the holding of
Gant, reasoning: “Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also
conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search
incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”76
Thus, Gant qualified Belton, and then ostensibly modified its own
qualifier. The decision qualified Belton by limiting its applicability to
situations where an arrestee retains genuine access to the automobile—
ostensibly irrespective of the nature of the offense for which the suspect
was arrested.77 However, Justice Scalia’s Thornton opinion provided the
foundation for an exception to this qualifier: even when access to the
vehicle has been eliminated by police control, a search is still reasonable
whenever the police have a “reasonable belief” that evidence related to the
crime might be in the vehicle.78
This reasonable belief modifier would have been relatively
unremarkable had Justice Scalia utilized slightly different language.
Probable cause would have been the easiest terminology to reconcile with
existing jurisprudence. Pursuant to the longstanding automobile exception
to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search of an automobile based on
probable cause is reasonable.79 This exception operates independently of
the Belton SITLA.80 Accordingly, even if the recent occupant is secured in
a manner that eliminates access to the automobile, police with probable
cause that evidence related to the offense for which the occupant was
arrested will be found in the automobile may search for that evidence
anywhere in the automobile where its presence is supported by probable
76

Id. at 343 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
Id. (“[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
at the time of the search.”).
78
Id. (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
79
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799–800 (1982) (holding that police officer can search
a vehicle without a warrant); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (holding that police
can conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe there is contraband in
the car).
80
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 & n.6 (1981) (finding that where a defendant’s “jacket
was located inside the passenger compartment of the car in which the [defendant] had been a passenger
just before he was arrested . . . [t]he jacket was thus within the area which we have concluded was
‘within the arrestee’s immediate control’ within the meaning of the Chimel
case . . . [and therefore] there is no need here to consider whether the search and seizure were
permissible under the so-called ‘automobile exception’”).
77
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81

cause.
Albeit less understandable, reasonable suspicion would have at least
been a term well established in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
practice.82 Reasonable suspicion has never justified a full evidentiary
search.83 Instead, pursuant to the landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio,84
reasonable suspicion justifies a “cursory” search for the limited purpose of
ensuring that the suspect is not armed and dangerous.85 This Terry “pat
down” was extended to the interior of an automobile in Michigan v.
Long,86 where the Court held that a cursory search of the interior of an
automobile is reasonable whenever a police officer has reasonable
suspicion that there may be a weapon within ready access of a passenger
allowed to re-enter the vehicle.87 However, because Justice Scalia used the
term “reasonable belief” as the litmus test for an authorized warrantless
search for evidence related to the arresting offense, it is difficult to
reconcile that term with the more limited protective scope of Terry and
Michigan. Nonetheless, had the Court substituted “suspicion” for “belief,”
it would have at least invoked an already established quantum of proof.
The Court explicitly acknowledged that the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement, coupled with the Terry search exception, justified
a search for evidence or for the protection of officer safety.88 The Court
also concluded that these alternative search justifications “together ensure
that officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary
concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle's recent occupant
justify a search.”89
Thus, as articulated, the holding of the case suggests that these are the
exclusive justifications for searching the automobile of a recently arrested
81
See Ross, 456 U.S. at 799–800 (holding that police officers who have probable cause that there
is contraband in a container in a vehicle may search the containers where such contraband may be, even
if it is not in plain view, and rejecting the prior rule that if the police know that the contraband is in a
container in the vehicle (as opposed to just somewhere in the vehicle), they must obtain a warrant to
open the container). In other words, Ross held that once a container is placed in a vehicle, it is
indistinguishable from the vehicle itself for purposes of the warrant exception.
82
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (authorizing limited cursory searches where police
harbored reasonable suspicion—rather than probable cause—of the presence of weapons).
83
See id. at 25–26 (“A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however,
must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.
Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to
harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a ‘full’
search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.” (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310
(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))).
84
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
85
Id. at 30–31.
86
463 U.S. 1032, 1036 (1983).
87
Id. at 1036, 1050.
88
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346–47 (2009).
89
Id. at 347.
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occupant: “Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”90 However, drawing
from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton the Court elaborated
on the justification to search the car of an arrested recent occupant, which
applies even when the suspect is secure and when Belton’s SITLA
authority has terminated:
[F]ollowing the suggestion in Justice Scalia’s opinion
concurring in the judgment in that case, we also conclude
that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a
search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that
evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.91
The Court did not, however, explain what it meant by the term
“reasonable belief,” a term it adopted from Justice Scalia's Thornton
concurrence. It therefore would be tempting to conclude that this term was
merely a synonym for probable cause—that the Court merely highlighted
the alternative existing “unique” automobile search justification pursuant
to the Ross automobile exception to the warrant requirement. However,
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gant exacerbates the uncertainty
related to the meaning of “reasonable belief,” the relevant portion of which
provides:
I would hold that a vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso
facto “reasonable” only when the object of the search is
evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of
another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe
occurred.92
There are two meanings that can be attributed to this explanation of
automobile search authority. Consistent with the existing range of
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the reference to probable cause
could qualify the two distinct search objectives that Justice Scalia
addresses: (1) search for evidence related to the arrested crime; or (2)
search for any other evidence in the automobile based on probable cause.
However, it is also plausible to read this portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion
as distinguishing between these two search objectives, indicating that
probable cause is required only when the object of the search is evidence
unrelated to the crime for which the suspect was arrested. This latter
90

Id. at 351.
Id. at 335 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
92
Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91
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interpretation underscores the majority’s reliance on Justice Scalia’s
Thornton concurrence in concluding that a search for evidence related to
the crime of arrest is justified when the police have a “reasonable belief”
that the evidence will be found in the automobile.93
One conclusion seems indisputable: had the Court intended to
emphasize the existing Ross automobile exception search authority, the
opinion’s use of the term “reasonable belief” instead of probable cause
becomes illogical. It is also illogical to assume the Court intended
reasonable belief to be a synonym for reasonable suspicion. First, as
already noted, reasonable suspicion had never before been understood as a
substantive authority justifying an evidentiary search, which is exactly
what the Gant reasonable belief standard permits. Second, where the
Court had previously extended the concept of reasonable suspicion to
another context, it utilized that exact term and not some synonym. In
Richards v. Wisconsin,94 for example, the Court addressed the question of
when it was reasonable for police to execute a warrant without first
knocking and announcing their presence.95 The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin had affirmed a trial court’s per se exception to the knock-andannounce requirement for felony drug warrant execution.96 In overruling
the decision, Justice Stevens wrote for the majority:
In order to justify a “no-knock” entry, the police must have a
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their
presence, under the particular circumstances, would be
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the
destruction of evidence. This standard—as opposed to a
probable-cause requirement—strikes the appropriate balance
between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in
the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy
interests affected by no-knock entries.97
The Court went on to state that although the reasonable suspicion
threshold was not a high burden to meet, it was nonetheless necessary to
justify the reasonableness of a no-knock entry.98 This extension of the
reasonable suspicion quantum of cause to a context beyond the Terry
investigatory stop situation suggests that where the Court intends to
endorse such an extension, it will use the precise terminology of reasonable
93

See id. at 343 (majority opinion).
520 U.S. 385 (1997).
95
Id. at 394.
96
Id. at 389–90.
97
Id. at 394.
98
Id. at 394–95.
94
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suspicion. This, in turn, supports the alternate inference: that the Court’s
use of the term “reasonable belief” was deliberate, and not a veiled
invocation of the reasonable suspicion quantum.99
IV. LOWER COURT UNCERTAINTY: REASONABLE SUSPICION, PROBABLE
CAUSE, OR SOMETHING NEW?
“Reasonable belief” has become a “nebulous standard” in continuing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.100 As Justice Alito correctly predicted
in his Gant dissent, this new standard is “virtually certain to confuse law
enforcement officers and judges for some time to come.”101 Not
surprisingly, lower courts wrestling with the ultimate meaning of
“reasonable belief” have come to myriad conclusions. Some courts have
determined that, outside of traffic violations, once a person is arrested and
outside the vehicle, Gant allows the police to search the vehicle for further
evidence of the crime for which he was arrested.102 Others see Gant as
providing a per se test for “reasonable belief” based on the nature of the
offense for which a suspect is arrested.103 In Reagan v. United States, the
court found that “reasonable belief” requires a court to determine, based on
common sense and the totality of the circumstances, whether the police had
cause to believe there would be evidence of the offense of the arrest in the
vehicle.104 In United States v. Page,105 the Fourth Circuit made a similar
determination, relying, however, on the presence of other evidence to
justify the search.106 As the Page court observed:
[I]t would appear that the majority in Gant distinguishes
between offenses for which it is unlikely that the arrestee’s
vehicle contains relevant evidence, i.e., traffic violations, and
offenses for which the recovery of such evidence is likely.
The Court in Gant specifically cited drug offenses as
illustrative of the exception to the rule announced.
Accordingly, under the rationale in Gant, the seizure of a
quantity of marijuana from the defendant, standing alone,
99

See id. at 385.
United States v. Page, 679 F. Supp. 2d 648, 652 (E.D. Va. 2009).
101
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting).
102
E.g., Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671, 677–79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); People v. Osborne, 96
Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
103
E.g., United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).
104
Id.
105
679 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Va. 2009).
106
See id. at 654 (finding that seizure of drugs from the person of the defendant after he was
stopped in the vehicle justified search of vehicle for drugs); see also Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863,
875–76 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding that drugs in plain view in the vehicle justified search); State v.
Snapp, 219 P.3d 971, 976–77 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that drugs in plain view and defendant's
movements to hide something in car gave police reasonable belief to search for drugs in vehicle), rev’d,
275 P.3d 289 (Wash. 2012).
100
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justified the search of the passenger compartment of his
vehicle.107
This position seems both logical and in accordance with the Court’s
annunciation in Gant.108
Perhaps “reasonable belief” is a twin sibling of the lower evidentiary
standard of “reasonable suspicion,” as espoused by the Colorado courts.
Some courts have “concluded that by using language like ‘reasonable to
believe’ and ‘reasonable basis to believe,’ the Supreme Court intended a
degree of articulable suspicion commensurate with that sufficient for
limited intrusions like investigatory stops.”109 In Perez v. People,110 the
Colorado Supreme Court found a direct link between “reasonable belief”
and the type of reasonable suspicion found in Terry v. Ohio111: “a
reasonable belief to conduct such a search exists when there is a ‘degree of
articulable suspicion commensurate with that sufficient for limited
intrusions like investigatory stops.’”112 To support the assumption, it is
noteworthy to observe that Terry, which gave life to “reasonable
suspicion,” seemed to suggest in its opinion that the two were indeed part
and parcel of the same concept:
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime . . . .
107
Page, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 654. Compare United States v. Joy, 336 F. App’x 337, 343 (4th Cir.
2009) (holding that it may be reasonable to believe evidence relating to the drug offenses may be
located in the vehicle), and United States v. Oliva, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57293 (S.D. Tex. July 1,
2009) (holding that police could reasonably believe that evidence of defendant’s arrest for DWI could
be found in the vehicle), with United States v. Megginson, 340 F. App’x 856, 857 (4th Cir. 2009)
(holding that arrest for domestic abuse did not justify search), and United States v. Majette, 326 F.
App’x 211, 213 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that arrest for suspended operator’s license did not warrant
search).
108
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2009) (“In many cases, as when a recent occupant
is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains
relevant evidence. But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a
basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein.”
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)); see also United States v. Matias-Maestres, 738 F. Supp.
2d 281, 293–96 (D.P.R. 2010) (holding that police could not have reasonable belief that evidence of
driver’s DUI would be found on passenger).
109
People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041, 1046 (Colo. 2010); see also People v. Chamberlain, 229
P.3d 1054, 1058 (Colo. 2010) (finding search incident to arrest for false reporting unreasonable where
defendant was handcuffed and in backseat of police vehicle, police possessed defendant’s driver’s
license listing her former address, her registration, and her proof of insurance, and it was not reasonable
to believe that defendant’s vehicle might contain evidence relevant to false reporting).
110
231 P.3d 957 (Colo. 2010).
111
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
112
Perez, 231 P.3d at 961 (quoting McCarty, 229 P.3d at 1046).
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[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety
or that of others was in danger.113
This rationale has repeatedly fallen on a receptive audience in the Colorado
courts, which are much more in tune with the notion that “reasonable
belief” equates to “reasonable suspicion.”
The Court's use of phrases like “reasonable to believe” and “reasonable
basis to believe” is a further indication that it intends some degree of
articulable suspicion, a standard which it has previously acknowledged as
meriting lawful intrusion in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. While
this particular language is often used synonymously with probable cause,
in light of the automobile exception—which already provides authority for
a warrantless evidentiary search where police have probable cause to
believe an automobile contains evidence of a crime—a requirement of
probable cause in this context would render the entire second prong of the
Gant SITLA exception superfluous. The Colorado Supreme Court stated:
“For this reason, and because the majority at several points requires only a
reasonable belief that evidence ‘might’ be found, it seems more likely that
the Court intended a lesser degree of suspicion commensurate with that
sufficient for limited intrusions, like investigatory stops.”114
While determining the meaning of “reasonable belief” in the Gant
decision has been met with uncertainty and a lack of clarity, determining
what “reasonable belief” is not has been less difficult. The idea that Gant’s
reasonable belief justification (the “evidentiary justification”) under an
automobile-related SITLA is somehow synonymous with the probable
cause requirement of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
has been dismissed by a number of lower court decisions, and to Justice
Alito it was a key defect of the Gant majority opinion.115 In fact, as
observed by the First Circuit, “every circuit that has considered the issue to
date has either concluded or assumed that the auto exception survived
under Gant . . . [and] the auto exception requires probable cause. But the
Gant evidentiary justification only requires a ‘reasonable basis.’ These
distinctions make a difference.”116
113
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146
(1972) (“So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the
suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective
purpose.” (emphasis added)).
114
Chamberlain, 229 P.3d at 1057. But see State v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650, 665 (Utah 2010) (“[A]n
objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous . . . does not create automatic
authorization for officers to conduct a [Terry] frisk.”).
115
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 364 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Why . . . is the standard for this
type of evidence-gathering search ‘reason to believe’ rather than probable cause?”).
116
United States v. Polanco, 634 F. 3d 39, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Arriaza,
401 F. App’x 810 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Aguilera, 625 F.3d 482, 485–86 (8th Cir. 2010);
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When coupled with Justice Scalia’s less than clear discussion of the
range of automobile search justifications, understanding this new term that
has been injected into the automobile search equation requires analysis that
drills deeper than the opinion itself to its apparent origin: United States v.
Rabinowitz117 and the Court’s early clarification of the SITLA exception.
V. THORNTON AND THE BIRTH OF ”REASONABLE BELIEF”
As the Gant majority notes, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Thornton v. United States118 first introduced the concept of “reasonable
belief” into the automobile SITLA equation.119 In Thornton, a police
officer observed suspicious behavior by the driver (Thornton) of an
automobile.120 The officer followed the suspect to a parking lot. Unlike in
Belton, the police officer did not immediately approach the vehicle.
Instead, he waited for the suspect to exit the vehicle. The officer then
approached Thornton and asked him several investigatory questions. His
suspicion was aroused that Thornton might be armed and dangerous, so the
officer performed a Terry search of Thornton, which led to the discovery
of narcotics on Thornton’s person. At that point, Thornton was placed
under arrest, and the officer searched the interior compartment of
Thornton’s vehicle, in which he found a firearm.121
Thornton sought to suppress the firearm as fruit of an unreasonable
search.122 The government responded that the search was justified
pursuant to Belton’s SITLA exception.123 The evidence was admitted and
Thornton was convicted.124 The case reached the Supreme Court on the
question of whether a Belton SITLA applied when the police arrest an
automobile occupant after the occupant exits the vehicle.125 The Court
concluded that requiring the police to approach the suspect while still in
the vehicle created an unnecessary risk to law enforcement officers. 126
United States v. Hinojosa, 392 F. App’x 260 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25
(D.C. Cir. 2010); United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010)).
117
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
118
541 U.S. 615 (2004).
119
See id. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would . . . limit Belton searches to cases where it is
reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” (emphasis
added)).
120
Id. at 617 (majority opinion) (“Officer Deion Nichols of the Norfolk, Virginia, Police
Department, who was in uniform but driving an unmarked police car, first noticed petitioner Marcus
Thornton when petitioner slowed down so as to avoid driving next to him.”).
121
Id. at 618.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 618–19.
124
Id. at 619.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 621–22 (“[U]nder the strictures of petitioner’s proposed ‘contact initiation’ rule, officers
who do so would be unable to search the car’s passenger compartment in the event of a custodial arrest,
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Accordingly, it held that Belton applied not only when the suspect was
arrested in the automobile, but also to the arrest of recent automobile
occupants.127
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia expressed his overall
dissatisfaction with the automobile SITLA exception.128 Essentially laying
the groundwork for Gant, he emphasized that Belton had become a blank
check, allowing the police to search automobiles after the arrest of an
occupant—and now even a recent occupant—irrespective of the presence
of factors related to the original rationale for the SITLA exception, such as
the risk that evidence will be destroyed or that the suspect will be able to
access a weapon to endanger the police.129 For Justice Scalia, the issue
was not whether the suspect was arrested in the automobile or after having
exited the automobile; the issue was whether the facts supported any
plausible exigency justifying application of the SITLA exception.130 In
short, Justice Scalia rejected the “bright line” Belton rule that the presence
of the automobile in the equation ipso facto created an exigency justifying
a SITLA, no matter how minor the offense of arrest, or how secure the
arrestee.131
Justice Scalia then articulated his alternative vision for the proper
tailoring of the Belton automobile SITLA exception. Unsurprisingly, this
focused on the original SITLA exception and the exigencies that justified
dispensing with the warrant and probable cause requirements for
conducting a search following arrest.132 As it originally did in Chimel v.
California,133 the Court endorsed the SITLA based on the historic practice
of police conducting a search of a suspect’s person in order to seize any
evidence in the suspect’s possession—thereby protecting it from
destruction—and to ensure the suspect did not have a secreted weapon that
could endanger the police.134 In Chimel, the Court concluded that any
intrusion resulting from the SITLA was incidental to the already more
potentially compromising their safety and placing incriminating evidence at risk of concealment or
destruction. The Fourth Amendment does not require such a gamble.”).
127
Id. at 622.
128
See id. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The consequence of Belton’s bright line rule is that]
we have now abandoned our constitutional moorings and floated to a place where the law approves of
purely exploratory searches of vehicles during which officers with no definite objective or reason for
the search are allowed to rummage around in a car to see what they might find.” (quoting United States
v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1999) (Trott, J., concurring))).
129
See id. at 631 (“Belton cannot reasonably be explained as a mere application of Chimel.
Rather, it is a return to the broader sort of search incident to arrest that we allowed before Chimel—
limited, of course, to searches of motor vehicles, a category of ‘effects’ which give rise to a reduced
expectation of privacy, and heightened law enforcement needs.” (internal citation omitted)).
130
Id. at 625–28.
131
See id. at 625.
132
Id. at 632.
133
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
134
Id. at 763.
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135

substantial intrusion of arrest.
Accordingly, so long as the arrest was
lawful, the search incident to the arrest produced no further offense to the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Chimel was, however, a double-edged sword. In Chimel, following the
arrest, the police searched Chimel’s person, the drawers and closets in the
bedroom where he was arrested, and other areas of the house wherein he
was arrested.136 The Court held that the search of Chimel and the area
within his immediate control, or “wingspan,” was reasonable, for that was
the area from which Chimel might be able to gain access to a weapon or
evidence.137 However, the Court also held that the police exceeded the
reasonable scope of the SITLA when they searched areas outside the room
in which he was arrested because there was simply no exigency to justify
such an expansive scope.138
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the Belton automobile variant of the
SITLA focused on the exigency foundation. More specifically, Justice
Scalia attacked the most troubling aspect of the Belton decision: the
Court’s holding that application of the SITLA exception to an automobile
would not depend on a case-by-case assessment of the presence of the
Chimel exigency considerations, but instead would be applied as a “bright
line” rule.139 In short, Justice Scalia took issue with the fact that Belton
had created an automatic search authority for automobiles that applied
even in the absence of the slightest exigency to justify the search; this was
a concern also highlighted by Justice O’Connor in Thornton when she
noted in her concurrence that “lower court decisions seem now to treat the
ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a
police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin
rationales of Chimel.”140
Justice Scalia first noted the obvious: that the bright line authority to
conduct an automobile SITLA established in Belton had become totally
untethered from the original Chimel justifications:
As one judge has put it: “[I]n our search for clarity, we have
now abandoned our constitutional moorings and floated to a
place where the law approves of purely exploratory searches
of vehicles during which officers with no definite objective
or reason for the search are allowed to rummage around in a
135
See id. at 776 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he invasion and disruption of a man’s life and
privacy which stem from his arrest are ordinarily far greater than the relatively minor intrusions
attending a search of his premises.”).
136
Id. at 754 (majority opinion).
137
Id. at 768.
138
Id.
139
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
140
Id. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).
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car to see what they might find.” I agree entirely with that
assessment.141
Instead of an outright rejection of this expansive application of Belton,
Justice Scalia took a different tack: he offered an alternative justification
for the scope of the Belton search authority. He reasoned: “If Belton
searches are justifiable, it is not because the arrestee might grab a weapon
or evidentiary item from his car, but simply because the car might contain
evidence relevant to the crime for which he was arrested.”142 This one
sentence opened a new front in the automobile search battle that would
evolve and culminate with the Gant decision. It also sowed the seed for
the “reasonable belief” justification adopted by the Gant majority.
Justice Scalia’s explanation of this alternative theory of Belton’s
automobile search authority is essential to understanding the meaning of
“reasonable belief” adopted by the Gant majority. According to his
Thornton concurrence, courts had historically endorsed the search for
evidence related to the crime of arrest, indicating that such searches had
always been considered reasonable: “Numerous earlier authorities support
this approach, referring to the general interest in gathering evidence related
to the crime of arrest with no mention of the more specific interest in
preventing its concealment or destruction.”143 Furthermore, endorsement
of these searches had nothing to do with concerns over the safety of police
officers or the risk that the evidence might be destroyed—the two
foundational pillars of the Chimel SITLA. It is therefore clear that Justice
Scalia regarded the search for evidence related to the crime of arrest as
justified on a wholly independent basis from the SITLA that Belton
extended to automobiles. Because this search justification is not
contingent on the SITLA exigency concerns, it is both automatic and
broader in scope than Justice Scalia’s conception of a legitimate SITLA, a
fact he had no difficulty endorsing:
There is nothing irrational about broader police authority to
search for evidence when and where the perpetrator of a
crime is lawfully arrested. The fact of prior lawful arrest
distinguishes the arrestee from society at large, and
distinguishes a search for evidence of his crime from general
rummaging. Moreover, it is not illogical to assume that
evidence of a crime is most likely to be found where the
suspect was apprehended.144
This was not intended to suggest that Chimel’s SITLA authority was
141

Id. at 628–29 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id. at 629.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 630.
142

2012]

ARIZONA V. GANT

201

invalid. Indeed, Justice Scalia emphasized that “Chimel’s [automobile
SITLA exception which focuses on] concealment or destruction of
evidence also has historical support.”145 Instead, his discussion of
evidentiary searches related to the crime of arrest seemed clearly intended
to offer a more logical rationale for the expansive application of Chimel to
the automobile context. Again, from his opinion:
[I]f we are going to continue to allow Belton searches on
stare decisis grounds, we should at least be honest about why
we are doing so. Belton cannot reasonably be explained as a
mere application of Chimel. Rather, it is a return to the
broader sort of search incident to arrest that we allowed
before Chimel . . . .146
In using the term “reasonable belief,” the Gant Court ultimately embraced
the honesty Justice Scalia demanded. Accordingly, “reasonable belief” can
only be understood in the broader context of the type of evidentiary search
Justice Scalia invoked in support of the continued validity of Belton—not a
variant of a Chimel search, but instead an evidentiary search rendered
reasonable by some alternative justification.
This analysis hearkens back to the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Rabinowitz.147 In Rabinowitz, police officers suspected the
defendant of unlawfully selling forged postage stamps.148 Based on his
sale of stamps to an undercover officer, the police obtained a warrant for
his arrest.149 However, they did not obtain a search warrant.150 Rabinowitz
was subsequently arrested at his place of business: an office.151
Immediately following his arrest, police searched Rabinowitz and his
office—including his desk, safe, and file cabinets—and seized 573 forged
stamps. He was indicted for possessing and concealing the stamps so
seized and for selling the four that had been purchased. The seized stamps
were admitted in evidence over his objection, and he was convicted on
both counts.152 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the search
was unreasonable solely because the police had a prior opportunity to
obtain a search warrant—a basis subsequently rejected by the Supreme
Court, but outside of the scope of this discussion.153
The Supreme Court determined that the search conducted
145

Id.
Id. at 631.
147
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
148
Id. at 57.
149
Id. at 57–58.
150
Id. at 59.
151
Id. at 58.
152
Id. at 59.
153
Id.
146
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contemporaneously with Rabinowitz’s arrest was reasonable and
accordingly reversed the court of appeals’ decision.154 The Court
emphasized, however, that “[w]hat is a reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula. . . . The recurring questions of the
reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and
circumstances of each case.”155 Although it decided Rabinowitz prior to its
seminal SITLA decision in Chimel v. California,156 the Court nonetheless
focused on the area within the arrestee’s immediate control.157 The Court
concluded that the nature of the business office justified the conclusion that
the entire room was within Rabinowitz’s immediate control, and therefore
held that the entire search fell within the SITLA exception.158
While the search of Rabinowitz himself certainly met the notion of an
area within his immediate control,159 the search of his file cabinet (where
the stamps were found) is almost impossible to square with this limitation.
The Court seemed unconcerned with the distinction, indicating that its
conception of “immediate control” was more expansive than that which
would be endorsed by Chimel decades later.160 Indeed, the ability to gain
ready access to the file cabinet seemed far less significant in Rabinowitz
than did the assumption that evidence of a crime is often found in the area
within the possession of the arrested suspect.
Despite invoking the SITLA doctrine to justify the search in
Rabinowitz, it seems relatively clear that the Court viewed the scope of that
authority quite differently than did the Court in the subsequent Chimel
decision. In Rabinowitz, the Court was obviously willing to endorse a
scope that included the entire office.161 The rationale for this expansive
154
Id. at 63–64, 66. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on a series of cases, including
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61 (citing Weeks and Agnello for the propositions that it is reasonable “to
search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as
its fruits or as the means by which it was committed,” Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392, and “[t]he right without
a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to
search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as
its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an
escape from custody, is not to be doubted,” Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30).
155
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63.
156
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
157
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63–64.
158
Id. at 64.
159
Id. at 60 (“[N]o one questions the right, without a search warrant, to search the person after a
valid arrest. The right to search the person incident to arrest always has been recognized in this country
and in England. Where one had been placed in the custody of the law by valid action of officers, it was
not unreasonable to search him.” (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392)).
160
Chimel only authorizes such contemporaneous searches in order to seize weapons or other
evidence that may be used to effect an escape, or to prevent the destruction of evidence. See Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969).
161
Id.
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scope was clearly based not on the type of exigency presumptively
associated with arrest, but instead on the mere fact that the offense was
committed in the location of arrest such that it was likely that evidence of
the offense could be found in that location. Indeed, the Court noted that
the authority for the search was based on both denial of the means to effect
escape and the traditionally accepted goal of discovering evidence of the
offense:
The right “to search the place where the arrest is made in
order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its
fruits or as the means by which it was committed” seems to
have stemmed not only from the acknowledged authority to
search the person, but also from the longstanding practice of
searching for other proofs of guilt within the control of the
accused found upon arrest. It became accepted that the
premises where the arrest was made, which premises were
under the control of the person arrested and where the crime
was being committed, were subject to search without a search
warrant. Such a search was not “unreasonable.”162
Including the “premises where the arrest was made” within the scope of
SITLA was therefore based on a reasonable linkage between the nature of
the offense and the type of evidence searched for and seized.163 The Court
cited another example to emphasize this point:
In Marron v. United States, the officers had a warrant to
search for liquor, but the warrant did not describe a certain
ledger and invoices pertaining to the operation of the
business. The latter were seized during the search of the
place of business but were not returned on the search
warrant, as they were not described therein. The offense of
maintaining a nuisance under the National Prohibition Act
was being committed in the room by the arrested bartender in
the officers’ presence. The search warrant was held not to
cover the articles seized, but the arrest for the offense being
committed in the presence of the officers was held to
authorize the search for and seizure of the ledger and
invoices, this Court saying: “The officers were authorized to
arrest for crime being committed in their presence, and they
lawfully arrested Birdsall. They had a right without a
warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to
find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal
162
163

Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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enterprise. . . . The closet in which liquor and the ledger were
found was used as a part of the saloon. And, if the ledger
was not as essential to the maintenance of the establishment
as were bottles, liquors and glasses, it was nonetheless a part
of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the
offense. And, while it was not on Birdsall’s person at the
time of his arrest, it was in his immediate possession and
control. The authority of officers to search and seize the
things by which the nuisance was being maintained extended
to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose.”164
The Rabinowitz Court then noted that, as long as the object of the
search was rationally related to the offense of arrest, it was sufficiently
distinguishable from an unreasonable general search:
[Prior] cases condemned general exploratory searches, which
cannot be undertaken by officers with or without a warrant.
In the instant case the search was not general or exploratory
for whatever might be turned up. Specificity was the mark of
the search and seizure here. There was probable cause to
believe that respondent was conducting his business illegally.
The search was for stamps overprinted illegally, which were
thought upon the most reliable information to be in the
possession of and concealed by respondent in the very room
where he was arrested, over which room he had immediate
control and in which he had been selling such stamps
unlawfully.165
In further support of its assessment of reasonable scope, the Court cited
Harris v. United States,166 a case that involved a SITLA that extended
throughout the arrestee’s apartment and lasted for five hours.167 In
concluding that the search was reasonable, the Court emphasized the
relationship between the nature of the offense and the objects of the search:
Nor can support be found for the suggestion that the search
could not validly extend beyond the room in which petitioner
was arrested. Petitioner was in exclusive possession of a four
room apartment. His control extended quite as much to the
bedroom in which the draft cards were found as to the living
room in which he was arrested. The canceled checks and
164
Rabinowitz 339 U.S. at 61–62 (citations omitted) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192, 198–99 (1927)).
165
Id. at 62–63.
166
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
167
Id. at 149.
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other instrumentalities of the crimes charged in the warrants
could easily have been concealed in any of the four rooms of
the apartment. . . . [T]he area which reasonably may be
subjected to search is not to be determined by the fortuitous
circumstance that the arrest took place in the living room, as
contrasted to some other room of the apartment.168
While even here the Court invoked the “immediate control” rationale
of SITLA,169 it seems to reflect a fiction; few would consider the entire
apartment of an arrestee to be within his “immediate control” after he is
placed in custody. Nonetheless, by characterizing the location of the arrest
as a “fortuitous” factor,170 the Court appeared more interested in
authorizing the search for evidence related to the offense at the location of
the arrest than in any exigency related to the arrestee’s ability to access
(and potentially destroy) such evidence, a theory obviously central to the
Rabinowitz holding.171
Justice Scalia’s “reasonable belief” concept—a concept ultimately
adopted by the Gant majority—can only be understood in light of this line
of decisions. Unlike the earlier decisions he invoked, Justice Scalia
confronted a barrier against merely including within the scope of a SITLA
the entire area in which a suspect was arrested: Chimel viewed the “area of
immediate control” as more limited than the area considered within that
scope in these earlier decisions. As noted above, by the time Thornton was
decided (long after Chimel), immediate control had become synonymous
with lunging distance, or wingspan, of the arrestee. Accordingly, Justice
Scalia was apparently compelled to develop an alternative theory to
resurrect the type of evidentiary search justified by the much broader scope
of the SITLA applied in Rabinowitz and its progeny.
VI. THE GANT BALANCE SHEET
There is no question that on the surface, Gant appears to severely
curtail the authority of police to conduct an automobile SITLA following
arrest of a vehicle occupant or recent occupant.172 While Gant did not
168

Id. at 152.
See id. (upholding SITLA despite it having spanned an entire apartment).
170
Id.
171
See id. at 152–53 (“The same meticulous investigation which would be appropriate in a search
for two small canceled checks could not be considered reasonable where agents are seeking a stolen
automobile or an illegal still. We do not believe that the search in this case went beyond that which the
situation reasonably demanded.”); Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63 (“Harris . . . is ample authority for the
more limited search here considered.” (citation omitted)).
172
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (“[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes police to
search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”).
169
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overrule Belton, a footnote in the majority opinion indicates that, although
still breathing, Belton is on life support:
Because officers have many means of ensuring the safe arrest
of vehicle occupants, it will be the rare case in which an
officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real
possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains. But in
such a case a search incident to arrest is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.173
The message is clear: it will be a rare case where the situation results in
the type of genuine access to the automobile necessary to justify
application of Belton.
This, however, does not mean a search contemporaneous with the
arrest of a vehicle occupant or recent occupant will now almost invariably
be considered unreasonable.174 In fact, quite the opposite is true. First, the
pre-existing search justifications resulting from probable cause (for a full
evidence search) or reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains a
weapon (for a cursory Terry interior sweep) are totally unaffected by
Gant.175 In fact, the opinion emphasizes the continuing validity of these
well-established theories of reasonableness.176 However, it is the inclusion
of Justice Scalia’s “reasonable belief” concept that will significantly
impact future automobile searches.
Assuming the police arrest a suspect after approaching her in a vehicle
or soon after she exits the vehicle, Gant essentially presumes that the
apprehension will result in restraint sufficient to eliminate any SITLA
justification.177 Unless someone else will be permitted to return to the
173

Id. at 343 n.4 (citation omitted).
See id. at 346 (stating that a broad reading of Belton is unnecessary to protect officers in light
of the many other exceptions to the warrant requirement).
175
Id. at 346–47.
176
See id. (“Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search
under additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand. For instance, Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), permits an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he
has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is dangerous and might access
the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons. If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle
contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982), authorizes a
search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. . . . Finally, there may be still
other circumstances in which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a search. Cf. Maryland v.
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that, incident to arrest, an officer may conduct a limited
protective sweep of those areas of a house in which he reasonably suspects a dangerous person may be
hiding)” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
177
Id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications
are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show
that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.”).
174
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vehicle to drive it away from the scene (such as a passenger who was not
arrested), the police will have no basis to conduct an interior sweep for
weapons pursuant to Michigan v. Long.178 If the police have probable
cause to believe that evidence is in the vehicle, then the Belton/Gant line of
authority becomes essentially irrelevant because of the alternate authority
to conduct a probable cause search of the vehicle without first obtaining a
warrant.179 However, what happens if none of these authorities are
triggered?
At this point, a “reasonable . . . [belief] the vehicle contains evidence
of the offense of arrest” becomes decisive.180 That belief justifies a full
search of the vehicle for that evidence.181 Reasonable belief therefore
cannot be analogous to probable cause (because the Gant Court recognized
that probable cause provides an independent basis for the evidentiary
search),182 or reasonable suspicion (because reasonable suspicion has never
justified a full evidentiary search).183 Instead, reasonable belief is best
understood as a tether—both historical and practical. Historically, it
represents a tether back to the originally broad scope of SITLA central to
Harris and Rabinowitz, but subsequently narrowed by Chimel. Practically,
it is a tether that connects the probable cause for the arrest to the search for
the evidence—a tether because it presupposes the absence of independent
probable cause to conduct the search (which would obviate the need for the
“reasonable belief” justification).
Accordingly, “reasonable belief” is best understood as a hybrid
between a procedural and substantive justification for reasonable
government action. The link it establishes between the justification for the
arrest and the justification for the subsequent vehicle search reflects the
procedural nature of the concept—in effect extending the justification for
the arrest to the search for evidence of the arrest. However, the concept
includes a modest yet important substantive aspect: the requirement that
the linkage between the arrest and the evidence searched for be reasonable.
This substantive element does not, however, seem analogous to either
reasonable suspicion or probable cause for one critical reason: there is no
requirement that the belief be based on any articulable fact that evidence is
178
463 U.S. 1032, 1052–53 (1983) (extending the concept of a Terry frisk to the interior of a
vehicle when the police have reasonable suspicion that someone can rapidly access a weapon inside the
vehicle).
179
See, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (authorizing a warrantless probable cause
search of any area of a vehicle in which evidence of criminal activity might be found).
180
Gant, 556 U.S. at 346.
181
Id. at 343.
182
See id. at 347 (“If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal
activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the
vehicle in which the evidence might be found.”).
183
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969).
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in the automobile. Instead, the mere nature of the offense of arrest is what
ostensibly renders the belief reasonable.184 That it is the nature of the
arrested offense and not any individualized articulable fact that establishes
reasonable belief seems almost indisputable after considering the genesis
of the concept. By reaching back to Harris and Rabinowitz, Justice Scalia
almost unquestionably resurrected the aspect of those decisions later
overruled by Chimel185: that the mere nature of the offense, and not the risk
of evidence destruction, danger to the police, or articulable facts
establishing probable cause is what justifies the broader scope of the search
associated with the arrest.186
Notably, Gant’s holding limits the “reasonable belief” standard to
automobile searches, demonstrating the minimal nature of the substantive
aspect of reasonable belief. In its endorsement of Justice Scalia’s Thornton
concept, the Court emphasized that limitation.187 It is a well-established
aspect of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that automobiles are afforded a
reduced expectation of privacy.188 This reduced expectation lies at the core
of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as well as the
extension of that exception to containers contained within an
automobile.189 Accordingly, it seems significant that the Court limited the
scope of a “reasonable belief” search to the automobile, and did not extend
it to any area within the arrestee’s possession (which would have been
more consistent with Justice Scalia’s Thornton reliance on Harris and

184
See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343–44 (“In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a
traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence.
But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the
passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.” (citations omitted)).
185
See Jack Blum, Note, Arizona v. Gant: Missing an Opportunity to Banish Bright Lines from
the Court’s Vehicular Search Incident to Arrest Jurisprudence, 70 MD. L. REV. 826, 826 (claiming that
the Gant Court should have restored an exigency-based standard similar to that in Chimel when it
deviated from the previous bright-line standard set forth in Belton and that the Court’s failure to do so
created an unacceptably vague precedent).
186
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). I use
“associated” because Chimel precludes characterizing this expanded scope as an aspect of a SITLA.
187
See Gant, 556 U.S. at 332–33 (“Although it does not follow from Chimel, circumstances
unique to the automobile context also justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” (emphasis added)
(quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
188
See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1985) (“When a vehicle is being used on the
highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for
residential purposestemporary or otherwisethe two justifications for the vehicle exception come
into play. First, the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually
moving. Second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor
vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling.” (footnote omitted)).
189
See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763–64 (1979) (discussing privacy levels with respect
to suitcases in automobiles).
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Rabinowitz).
While the Court is obviously willing to tolerate an
expanded search authority in relation to a recent arrestee’s automobile, the
opinion does not (at least explicitly) indicate an analogous tolerance for
other areas within an arrestee’s possession, such as her home.
Ultimately, revealing the full extent of Gant’s “reasonable belief”
search authority will depend on further jurisprudence.191 Is a reasonable
belief established solely by the nature of the crime of arrest, or is some
additional quantum of proof required? If based solely on the offense, what
offenses create such reasonable belief? What is the scope of the
automobile search authority triggered by reasonable belief? Is it, like the
Belton SITLA, restricted to the interior compartment of the automobile?
Or does it extend to any part of the automobile where evidence may be
found (like the trunk)? Will a reasonable belief justify a post-arrest search
of other areas within an arrestee’s possession, such as a home or office?
Does the authority extend to all containers in the automobile?192 If, as
proposed herein, reasonable belief is indeed a new search justification,
these questions of scope and substance become unavoidable. At this point,
one thing seems clear: Gant is a genuine double-edged sword in the realm
of search justification.
A. The Good (for Police)
By qualifying the constriction of Belton’s SITLA authority with the
concept of reasonable belief,193 the Supreme Court did not, as many
assumed, inflict a mortal blow to post-arrest vehicle searches; Gant’s
impact was anything but such a blow. First, as noted by the Court, existing
exceptions to the warrant and/or probable cause requirements continue to
provide police with substantial vehicle search authority.194 However,
police now also have search authority derived from the nature of the
offense for which the suspect is arrested. Looking to the pre-Chimel
jurisprudence that Justice Scalia relies on as the foundation for his
190
See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring) (relying on the general interest in
gathering relevant evidence). Neither Rabinowitz nor Harris involved a search of a suspect’s vehicle.
Rabinowitz involved the search of a one-room office for counterfeit stamps, while Harris involved the
search of an apartment and its contents for stolen checks.
191
See George M. Dery III, A Case of Doubtful Certainty: The Court Relapses into Search
Incident to Arrest Confusion in Arizona v. Gant, 44 IND. L. REV. 395, 396 (2011) (discussing how the
Court’s decision in Gant offered very little guidance in terms of proximity, limits, and applicability and
left the many unclear aspects of the Gant decision for future courts to interpret, thereby undermining
the legitimacy of law enforcement activities).
192
Considering that both the Belton SITLA and the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement permit the search of containers in the vehicle, it is almost inconceivable that this question
will be answered in the negative.
193
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (describing the concept of reasonable belief
under Belton).
194
Id. at 346.
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“reasonable belief” concept, the range of offenses that will trigger this
search authority appears to be quite broad.195
A vehicle search based on “reasonable belief” that evidence is located
in the vehicle will unquestionably provide police lawful access to the
vehicle’s interior. As a result, when linked to the plain view doctrine,196
this aspect of Gant’s vehicle search authority provides an additional benefit
for police. So long as the extent of the vehicle search is proper in its scope,
any evidence or contraband discovered may be seized, irrespective of
whether it is evidence of the crime of arrest. Nor is there any reason to
assume that “reasonable belief” search authority does not extend to the
trunk of the automobile. Because the foundation of this search authority
differs from the protective search foundation of SITLA, restricting the
scope to the interior compartment (like SITLA) would be illogical. So
long as evidence related to the crime of arrest might be in the trunk, the
trunk would be within proper scope. The same logic would apply to
containers inside the automobile, so long as evidence of the crime of arrest
might be found in those containers.
The net result of all of these considerations is that contrary to the
restrictive tone of Gant, the “reasonable belief” prong of the decision will
in fact often expand police search authority. Furthermore, because lawful
vantage point and access to seize contraband then triggers the plain view
doctrine,197 associated seizure authority will not be limited to evidence of
the crime of arrest, but will extend to any contraband or evidence
discovered in plain view while searching for evidence of the crime of
arrest. However, there is one context where Gant will modify police
authority to conduct post-arrest vehicle searches.
Ironically, this
modification will effectively nullify an authority not even addressed in the
Gant opinion: the pretextual arrest.
B. The Good (for the Public)
If the range of offenses triggering a “reasonable belief” that evidence
195
See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631–32 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Rather, it is a return to the broader
sort of search incident to arrest that we allowed before Chimel—limited, of course, to searches of motor
vehicles, a category of ‘effects’ which give rise to a reduced expectation of privacy and heightened law
enforcement needs.” (citations omitted)).
196
The plain view doctrine permits a warrantless seizure of evidence and contraband discovered
in plain view during a lawful observation. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)
(“It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view
without a warrant.”); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
465); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 131 (1990) (discussing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465).
197
See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136–37 (1990) (requiring a police officer seizing evidence in plain
view (i) to be lawfully present at the place where the evidence can be plainly viewed; (ii) to have a
lawful right of access to the object; and (iii) that the incriminating character of the object is
immediately apparent).
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related to the offense will be in the automobile is quite broad, the value of
restricting the Belton SITLA might appear questionable. However, there is
one type of situation where Gant will significantly curtail police search
authority: what the Court previously characterized as a pretextual arrest.
In limiting police search authority, Gant provides some protection for an
individual’s limited expectation of privacy in his vehicle. In United States
v. Robinson,198 the Supreme Court held that any lawful arrest triggers the
authority to conduct a SITLA, irrespective of the subjective motive of the
arresting officer.199 In that case, the defendant argued that his arrest for a
minor traffic infraction was in fact motivated by the arresting officer’s
desire to conduct a SITLA, and therefore was pretextual.200 Because a
reasonable officer would rarely arrest an individual for such a minor
offense, the defendant argued that the subsequent SITLA was
unreasonable.201
Rejecting this argument, the Court established a bright line trigger for
the SITLA: lawful arrest.202 Motive for arrest is simply irrelevant, as long
as the arrest was authorized by law and was conducted pursuant to valid
probable cause.203 The defendant (and the dissent) argued that this ruling
would effectively provide police with a blank check for searching vehicles
because existing statutes allow for arrest for such a wide variety of traffic
violations.204 The Court, however, was unpersuaded that this reality
justified a case-by-case assessment of the propriety of the arrest or the
necessity for the SITLA.205 The Court prohibited lower courts from
probing any possible pretext for the arrest. Reasoning that the police
would be concerned that their justification for the arrest would be
subjected to subsequent judicial scrutiny, the Court rejected a rule that
would place police at risk by causing them to hesitate in conducting
SITLAs.206 The term “pretextual arrest,” therefore, while a factual reality
198

414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Id. at 235.
200
See id. at 221 n.1 (“Respondent argued below that Jenks may have used the subsequent traffic
violation arrest as a mere pretext for a narcotics search which would not have been allowed by a neutral
magistrate had Jenks sought a warrant.”).
201
Id.
202
See id. at 235 (“It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and
we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that
Amendment.”).
203
See id. at 226 (“Thus, the broadly stated rule, and the reasons for it, have been repeatedly
affirmed in the decisions of this Court since Weeks v. United States, supra, nearly 60 years ago. Since
the statements in the cases speak not simply in terms of an exception to the warrant requirement, but in
terms of an affirmative authority to search, they clearly imply that such searches also meet the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of reasonableness.”).
204
Id. at 235.
205
Id.
206
Id.
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212

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:177

in the view of many, is a legal oxymoron.
Gant, however, has substantially altered this conclusion. It is clear that
the decision in no way modified Robinson’s holding that the subjective
motive of an arresting officer is irrelevant to assessing the propriety of a
SITLA. However, Gant’s impact on the ability to use an arrest for traffic
infractions as the trigger for a SITLA is profound. Because evidence
related to a traffic offense will rarely, if ever, be in the vehicle itself,
SITLA authority will terminate once the arrested driver or passenger is
under effective police control—a situation the Gant Court indicated would
rarely not be the case. This control will eliminate any legitimate need to
search the vehicle in order to secure any weapons within the arrestee’s
lunging distance. The only other justification for a vehicle search
following Gant would be reasonable belief that evidence related to the
offense will be in the vehicle, which will rarely be the case in relation to
traffic offenses. Indeed, Gant is an example of how traffic related offenses
do not trigger such reasonable belief. Accordingly, whether as a pretext to
gain the opportunity to search a suspect’s vehicle, or as a legitimate
exercise of police authority, traffic related arrests will no longer justify a
search of the arrestee’s vehicle absent some alternative exception to the
warrant and/or probable cause requirements.
Traffic offense arrests are precisely the type of offenses that previously
offered police a pretext to conduct an exploratory search of an automobile
without probable cause. Limiting post-arrest search authority in relation to
such offenses is, as the Court emphasized in Gant, an important step
forward in reconnecting the automobile SITLA with the reasonableness
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.207 Thus, although the Court in no
way addressed the continued validity of Robinson, the effect of its decision
will in large measure achieve the relief that was sought but denied in
Robinson. Like Gant himself, future suspects arrested for traffic
infractions will be protected from reliance on those offenses as a
justification for a general search of their automobiles.
VII. CONCLUSION
Reconnecting the automobile SITLA with the underpinnings of the
original SITLA exception—denying a recently arrested suspect access to
evidence and/or weapons—was the primary focus of the Gant decision.
This aspect of the decision nullified a troubling legal fiction that enabled
police to transform any arrest of a vehicle occupant or recent occupant to a
general search of the vehicle, unsupported by any individualized suspicion.
While Belton’s automobile SITLA authority was not eliminated, as the
Court noted, the likelihood that most arrested vehicle occupants would
207
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rarely retain the type of genuine access to the automobile to trigger Belton
indicates that the true automobile SITLA will now be a rare occurrence.208
Had the Gant majority limited the decision to this constriction of the
Belton automobile SITLA, a clear range of automobile search options
would have emerged, all of which would have been based on wellestablished Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In the rare situations where
an arrested vehicle occupant retained genuine access to the vehicle interior,
police would be authorized to search the vehicle interior pursuant to
Belton. In most situations, where the control over the arrestee deprives
him of such access, probable cause that evidence is in the vehicle would
trigger the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and thereby
allow police to search the vehicle for such evidence, subject to the
limitations imposed based on the nature of the evidence. Even without
probable cause to search for evidence or genuine concern that the arrestee
or another individual will gain access to the vehicle interior, reasonable
suspicion that another individual will gain ready access to a weapon once
the vehicle is released will allow police to conduct a cursory “sweep” of
the vehicle interior to ensure their safety. Finally, if the vehicle is
impounded as an incident to the arrest, it will almost always result in an
inventory search.209 Any evidence discovered during any of these searches
may be seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine.
This range of search options would have provided police with a
powerful investigatory arsenal. However, the majority added a new
weapon to that arsenal: the authority to search the vehicle for evidence
related to the crime of arrest whenever police have “reason[] to believe”
that such evidence may be in the vehicle.210 While the Court emphasized
that traffic violations like the one leading to Gant’s arrest would rarely
produce such reasonable belief,211 it unfortunately did not define what that
term required. As noted in this Article, it may be tempting to equate
reasonable belief with reasonable suspicion. However, doing so is
inconsistent with the fundamental limitations on the authority derived from
reasonable suspicion: reasonable suspicion has simply never been a
sufficient quantum of cause to justify an evidentiary search.212 Because,
208
Id. at 343 n.4 (“Because officers have many means of ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle
occupants, it will be the rare case in which an officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real
possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains.”).
209
See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (“When vehicles are impounded,
local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the
automobile’s contents.”).
210
Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
211
Id. at 343.
212
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1968) (“A search for weapons in the absence of
probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation. Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically
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according to Gant, a reasonable belief creates just such a justification, it is
illogical to conclude that the Court intended the term to be a synonym for
reasonable suspicion. This conclusion is bolstered by the Court’s decision
in Richards v. Wisconsin,213 which illustrates that where the Court intends
to extend the concept of reasonable suspicion to other contexts (in
Richards the justification for dispensing with the knock and announce
requirement), it uses that term rather than some cryptic synonym. 214 It is
even more illogical to conclude that reasonable belief was intended to be a
synonym for probable cause. First, the terminology is markedly different
from probable cause. More importantly, treating reasonable belief as such
a synonym would render the term superfluous; the existence of probable
cause alone provides an independent and well-established justification to
search for evidence in the automobile at the scene of arrest without a
warrant.215
Tracing the roots of Gant’s reasonable belief concept back to its
origins reveals the most logical meaning of the term: a procedural tether
between the probable cause for the arrest and the search for evidence in the
automobile. A review of Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton
v. United States, the opinion on which the Gant majority relies for the
reasonable belief concept, indicates that it was never conceived as a
substantive causal justification.216 Instead, it was intended to be a modern
day variant of the “area within the arrestee’s possession” concept that
defined the legitimate scope of a SITLA prior to Chimel’s narrowing of
that scope to the arrestee’s “lunging distance.” However, Chimel did in
fact narrow the scope of the SITLA from the Harris/Rabinowitz “area in
possession” to the arrestee’s “lunging distance.” As a result, it was
impossible to assert that a search of the automobile of a recent arrestee for
evidence related to the offense is justified because the automobile was in
his “possession” at the time of the arrest. Nonetheless, the logic of that
aspect of Harris and Rabinowitz could be resurrected on one condition: the
nature of the offense of arrest leads to a reasonable belief that evidence
associated with such offense is normally found in the area within the
arrestee’s possession. Ultimately, this logic led the Gant majority to allow
the search for such evidence in an automobile based solely on the nature of
the offense, with no other articulable basis to justify the search. This
indicates two unavoidable conclusions. First, the “reasonable belief”
be characterized as something less than a ‘full’ search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.”
(citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))).
213
520 U.S. 385 (1997).
214
Id. at 394–96.
215
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817 (1982) (providing an example of a legitimate
warrantless search).
216
541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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search authority of Gant is entirely distinct from SITLA authority,
indicating that the scope limitations of the automobile SITLA are
inapplicable. Second, reasonable belief is not synonymous with reasonable
suspicion because of the lack of an individualized articulable fact
requirement to establish the belief. It is the nature of the offense of arrest
alone, and no specific indicator of the presence of evidence in the
automobile, that renders the belief reasonable.
The net result of Gant, therefore, is not as debilitating to police as it
may first appear. In fact, police retain all of the pre-existing vehicle search
justifications (a point emphasized by the Gant majority). While SITLA
authority will normally be terminated once the arrestee is restrained, this
will not always prohibit a suspicion-less search of the automobile. If the
offense of arrest is one that normally involves the possession of associated
evidence, police will be authorized to search the vehicle. Furthermore,
unlike the SITLA search, these “reasonable belief” searches will not be
confined to the interior compartment of the automobile. As long as it is the
type of evidence that may be concealed on other parts of the vehicle, those
parts (most importantly the trunk) should fall within the scope of the
justification.
Gant does, however, substantially alter one particularly troubling type
of post-arrest vehicle search: those based on arrest for a traffic infraction.
These SITLA’s have always seemed troubling because of the perception
that police use the arrest as a pretext in order to trigger SITLA authority. It
is clear that the Court has foreclosed the ability to challenge the subjective
motivation for an arrest, and that nothing in Gant altered that aspect of
SITLA. However, because the arrestee will rarely, if ever, have evidence
related to a traffic arrest in the automobile, Gant effectively nullifies the
efficacy of the SITLA triggered by a traffic arrest. The arrest will
presumptively result in restraint of the arrestee, terminating the SITLA
authority. This fact, when coupled with the inability to assert a reasonable
belief that evidence related to the offense will be found in the vehicle, will
place any vehicle search based on the arrest outside the bounds of
reasonableness defined by Gant.

216

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:177

